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I. INTRODUCTION
C LOUD Radio-Access Network (C-RAN) is a promising architecture to meet the demand for higher data rates in next generation wireless networks. In these systems, the base-stations act as relays and are connected via high-speed backhaul links to a cloud network. Encoding and decoding operations happen centrally in the cloud. The study of fundamental information theoretic limits and optimal coding techniques for such systems is a fertile area of research.
Motivated by C-RAN, we study a model where the source is connected to M relay terminals using orthogonal links with a fixed capacity. The relays transmit to the destination over a wireless multiple-access channel. Such a setup is known as the diamond-relay network [1] - [5] . We study this model in the presence of an eavesdropper who can eavesdrop the orthogonal links from the source to the relays as well as the wireless transmission from the relays. We require that a message be transmitted reliably to the legitimate receiver, while keeping it confidential from the eavesdropper. We adopt the informationtheoretic notion of confidentiality, widely used in the literature on the wiretap channel [6] - [23] . We thus refer to our setup as the wiretapped diamond-relay channel.
While the secrecy capacity of both the scalar Gaussian wiretap channel and its multi-antenna extension can be achieved using Gaussian codebooks [8] - [10] , the optimal schemes in multiuser channels are considerably more intricate. Very recently, Xie and Ulukus [24] studied the secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) for one-hop Gaussian multiuser channels such as the multiple-access channel and the interference channel. It turns out that interference alignment [25] , [26] plays a central role in achieving the optimal secure d.o.f. While coding schemes based on Gaussian codebooks can only achieve zero secure d.o.f., the schemes presented in [24] involve transmitting a combination of information and jamming signals at each transmitter and judiciously precoding them such that the noise symbols align at the legitimate receiver(s), yet mask information symbols at the eavesdropper. This approach has been extended for the case with no eavesdropper's channel state information (CSI) at the legitimate parties in [27] and [28] . We note that a combination of jamming and interference alignment is also required in the confidential MIMO broadcast channel with delayed channel state information [29] and the compound MIMO wiretap channel [30] .
The diamond-relay channel that we consider is a two-hop network where the first hop consists of orthogonal links from the source to the relays, while the second hop is a multipleaccess channel from the relays to the destination. Such a network is considerably different from one-hop networks as the channel inputs from the relays need not be mutually independent. The source can transmit common/independent message, common noise, or any combination of those to the relays. In [31] , for the diamond-relay channel where an eavesdropper can wiretap only the multiple-access portion of the channel, it is shown that transmitting common noise over the source-relay links facilitates more efficient jamming for both the case with full CSI and the case with no eavesdropper's CSI. For example, a key constituent scheme proposed in [31] for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI is computation for jamming (CoJ) where the source transmits a function of information and common noise symbols to two relays in order that the common noise symbols introduced to jam information symbols at the eavesdropper can be canceled at the destination through suitable precoding. When there are more than two relays, this scheme operates in a time-sharing basis in a way that only two source-relay links are utilized in each sub-scheme. 1 The work [31] has been extended to the scenarios where the relays can (partially) communicate each other and it was shown to be sufficient to use the conferencing links only for transmitting noise symbols [32] , [33] .
In the present paper, the optimal secure d.o.f. of the wiretapped diamond-relay channel is established for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI. In our wiretapped diamond-relay channel, the eavesdropper not only observes the relay transmissions through another multiple-access channel, but also observes a certain number of source-relay links. The legitimate terminals do not know which subset of source-relay links are revealed to the eavesdropper, except for the total number of such links. We note that the protection strategies against an eavesdropper for wireless networks and for wirelined networks are quite different. For wireless networks, we exploit the property that channels over different node pairs differ, and the interference alignment or beamforming strategies used in [31] rely on this property. For wirelined network, the eavesdropper exactly observes a subset of communication links without distortion and secure network coding (SNC) [34] , [35] -like strategies are needed in a way that the messages being transferred are masked by some fictitious messages whose effect can be removed at the legitimate destination afterwards but not at the eavesdropper. Hence, considering wiretapped (wirelined) broadcast part introduces a new dimension to the scenario where only the (wireless) multiple access part is wiretapped. Indeed, it is not straightforward to combine the SNC and the proposed schemes in [31] . We note that the proposed schemes in [31] consist of sub-schemes that require asymmetric link d.o.f. and hence the amount of wiretapped information varies over time according to the unknown location of wiretapped links. Thus, we first develop symmetric version of the proposed schemes in [31] and then combine them with SNC-like scheme to account for non-secure source-relay links. While the conventional SNC has been developed for fully wired networks, we incorporate SNC by utilizing the nature of wireless networks in a way that the fictitious messages introduced in the source-relay links due to SNC are canceled at the destination by beamforming over the wireless multipleaccess channel. To that end, we delicately design the form of fictitious messages and the beamforming vectors and also show the existence of SNC matrix over real numbers. From a technical point of view, the secrecy analysis involves accounting for the observations from the source-relay links as well as the multiple-access wiretap channel and is considerably more involved. Furthermore, the secure d.o.f. is shown to be the same even when the knowledge of the compromised links is available. Indeed our converse is established via this genieaided approach.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally state our model of wiretapped diamond-relay channel. The main result on the secure d.o.f. is presented in Section III. For the achievability part, our proposed schemes are described at a high-level in Section IV and are rigorously stated in Appendix A. The converse part is proved in Section V. We conclude this paper in Section VI.
The following notation is used throughout the paper. For two integers i and j , [i : j ] denotes the set {i, i + 1, · · · , j }. 
II. MODEL
Consider a diamond-relay channel that consists of an orthogonal broadcast channel from a source to M ≥ 2 relays and a Gaussian multiple-access channel from the M relays to a destination. In the broadcast part, the source is connected to each relay through an orthogonal link of capacity C. In the multiple-access part, the channel output Y 1 (t) at time t is given as
in which X k (t) is the channel input at relay k, h k (t)'s are channel fading coefficients, and Z 1 (t) is additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance. The transmit power constraint at relay k is given as
where n denotes the number of channel uses.
In this paper, we consider a scenario illustrated in Fig. 1 , where an eavesdropper wiretaps both the broadcast part and the multiple-access part of the diamond-relay channel. In the broadcast part, the eavesdropper can wiretap W source-relay links. Let N = M − W denote the number of secure sourcerelay links. We assume that the location of wiretapped links is unknown to the source, relays, and destination. In the multipleaccess part, the eavesdropper observes Y 2 (t) at time t given as
where g k (t)'s are channel fading coefficients and Z 2 (t) is additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance. We assume a fast fading scenario where h k (t)'s and g k (t)'s are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion over time according to an arbitrary real-valued joint density function
satisfying that (i) all joint and conditional density functions are bounded and (ii) there exists a positive finite number B such that for
) denote the legitimate channel state information (CSI) and the eavesdropper's CSI at time t, respectively. We assume that the source does not know both the legitimate CSI and the eavesdropper's CSI and the eavesdropper knows both the CSI's. The relays and destination are assumed to know only the legitimate CSI. 3 A (2 n R , n) code consists of a message G ∼ Unif[1 : 4 a stochastic encoder at the source that (randomly) maps
. The probability of error is given as P
A secrecy rate of R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (2 n R , n) codes such that lim n→∞ P (n) e = 0 and
for all T ⊆ [1 : M] such that |T | = W . The secrecy capacity is the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates. We also consider the case where the location of wiretapped links is known to all parties. Let T denote the index set of relays whose links from the source are wiretapped. In this case, an achievable secrecy rate is defined by requiring (3) to be satisfied for the known T .
In this paper, we are interested in asymptotic behavior of the secrecy capacity when P tends to infinity. 
For the achievability part of Theorem 1, two constituent schemes were proposed in [31] . One scheme is a time-shared version of the BCJ scheme, where in each sub-scheme, a single relay operates as a source and the other relays operate as helpers according to the BCJ scheme [27] . The other scheme is a time-shared version of the CoJ scheme, where in each sub-scheme, the source and a pair of relays operate according to the CoJ scheme [31, Scheme 5] while the other relays remain idle. For the converse part of Theorem 1, a technique was introduced in [31] that captures the trade-off between the message rate and the amount of individual randomness injected at each relay.
The following theorem establishes the secure d.o.f. of the wiretapped diamond-relay channel for the general case. The achievability part of Theorem 2 when the location of wiretapped links is known can be easily proved by generalizing the proposed schemes in [31] . However, when the location of wiretapped links is unknown, it is not straightforward to extend the proposed schemes in [31] because their subschemes require asymmetric link d.o.f. and hence the amount of wiretapped information depends on the unknown location of wiretapped links. To resolve this issue, we first propose simultaneous BCJ (S-BCJ) and simultaneous CoJ (S-CoJ) schemes for the case with the knowledge of location of wiretapped links. Then we incorporate SNC on top of those schemes for the case without the knowledge of location of wiretapped links. Our proposed schemes are described at a high-level in Section IV and rigorously stated in Appendix A. The converse part of Theorem 2 is proved in Section V.
Theorem 2: The secure d.o.f. of the wiretapped diamondrelay channel is equal to
d s = min α, M−1 M , N = 1 min Nα, Nα+M−1 M+1 , 1 , N ≥ 2(
IV. ACHIEVABILITY
To prove the achievability part of Theorem 2, it suffices to show the achievability of the following corner points:
In the following, we first propose S-BCJ scheme achieving
for the special case of N = M. Then, we generalize them for the general case of N ≤ M with the knowledge of location of wiretapped links. Subsequently, we incorporate SNC on top of the S-BCJ and S-CoJ schemes for the case of N ≤ M without the knowledge of location of wiretapped links. To provide main intuition behind our schemes, let us give a high-level description of our schemes in this section. A detailed description with rigorous analysis is relegated to Appendix A.
In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , our proposed schemes are illustrated for M = 3, where rectangles labeled with V , U , F represent message, noise, and fictitious message symbols, respectively, and a rectangle labeled with L represents a linear combination of fictitious message symbols. A column of symbols with fat side lines implies that those symbols are aligned and occupy the d.o.f. of a single symbol. 5 Note that for
can be shown to be achievable
M] are aligned at the destination and (ii) V k, j 's can be distinguished by the destination. Since U k, j 's are not aligned and occupy a total of 1 d.o.f at the eavesdropper, the message can be shown to be secure.
2) S-CoJ Scheme for N
Then, the relays send what they have received in a way that (i) each of U k 's is beamformed in the null space of the destination's channel and (ii) V k 's can be distinguished by the destination. Since U k 's are not aligned and occupy a total of 1 d.o.f at the eavesdropper, the message can be shown to be secure.
B. General Case of N ≤ M With the Knowledge of Location of Wiretapped Links
In this case, we send nothing over the wiretapped links. Without loss of generality, let us assume that the first N links are secure.
1) S-BCJ Scheme Achieving
The source represents the message of d.o.f. 
C. General Case of N ≤ M Without the Knowledge of Location of Wiretapped Links
When the location of wiretapped links is unknown, the information sent over the source-relay links in the S-BCJ and S-CoJ schemes should be masked by additional randomness. To that end, we introduce independent fictitious message symbols whose total d.o.f. is the same as the total d.o.f. of wiretapped links. Then, in the S-BCJ and S-CoJ schemes assuming a certain location of wiretapped links (e.g., the last W links), we add a linear combination of these fictitious message symbols to each element sent from the source to the relays. By doing so, the message can be shown to be secure regardless of the location of wiretapped links, while the fictitious message symbols are beam-formed in the null space of the destination and hence the achievable secure d.o.f. is not affected.
This technique of masking the information by adding a linear combination of fictitious message symbols is similar to SNC [34] , [35] , and hence we call our schemes S-BCJ-SNC and S-CoJ-SNC. However, it should be noted that our schemes assume computation over real numbers to enable the beam-forming of fictitious message symbols over the multiple-access part, while the conventional SNC has been developed for fully wired networks and assumes computation over finite field.
1) S-BCJ-SNC Scheme Achieving
As in the S-BCJ scheme when the last W links are wiretapped, the source represents the message of d.o.f. (1) and (2): (6) with the constraint
A. Proof of the Converse Part of Theorem 2 for the Case With the Knowledge of Location of Wiretapped Links
Likewise, it can be shown that there is no loss of secure d.o.f. in considering the deterministic model (6) and (7) for the multiple-access part of our model. 6 Hence, in this section, let us assume that the multiple-access part is given as (6) and (7), instead of (1) and (2). Without loss of generality, we assume that the first N links are secure, i.e., T = [N + 1 : M]. Furthermore, we assume that g n in addition to h n is available at the destination, which only possibly increases the secure d.o.f. Hence, h n and g n are conditioned in every entropy and mutual information terms in this section, but are omitted for notational convenience. In the following, c i 's for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . are used to denote positive constants that do not depend on n and P.
First, we obtain n R (a) 6 We omit a formal proof as it is straightforward from that in [ where (a) is due to the Fano's inequality, (b) is from the secrecy constraint, and (c) is because the deterministic model (6) is assumed.
Next, to bound H (X n i |S n i ) for i ∈ [1 : M], we start from (9) to obtain
where (a) is due to the following chain of inequalites:
where i c denotes (18) and (24), we have
Furthermore,
can be bounded as follows: 7 We remind that h n and g n are conditioned in every entropy and mutual information terms in this section.
where P X n
denotes the set of all possible distributions of codewords satisfying the power constraint (7) and (a) is from [37, Sec. 6] .
By substituting (37) to (34) 
For the special case of N = 1, to derive a tighter bound, we start from (15):
Now, by combining (40) and (24), we have
where (a) is from similar steps used to obtain (37) and (b) is due to the Markov chain
where (a) is from [28, Lemma 2] . By combining (44) and (51), we obtain
which concludes the proof. We note that the proof technique used for the special case of N = 1 can be extended for the general case of N ≥ 1, but the resultant bound is loose when N > 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we established the optimal secure d.o.f. of the wiretapped diamond-relay channel where an external eavesdropper not only wiretaps the relay transmissions in the multiple-access part, but also observes a certain number of source-relay links in the broadcast part. The secure d.o.f. was shown to be the same for the cases with and without the knowledge of location of wiretapped links. For the former case, we proposed two constituent jamming schemes. The first scheme is the S-BCJ scheme where the noise symbols are aligned at the destination and the second scheme is the S-CoJ scheme where the noise symbols are beam-formed in the null space of the destination's channel. For the latter case where the location of wiretapped links is unknown, we combined a SNC-like scheme with S-BCJ and S-CoJ in a way that (i) the fictitious message symbols of SNC mask all the message and artificial noise symbols transmitted over the source-relay links and (ii) the fictitious message symbols can be canceled at the destination via beamforming at the relays. We believe that our results on the wiretapped diamond-relay channel are an important step towards understanding the secrecy capacity of general multi-terminal networks, which remains a largely open problem till date.
APPENDIX PROOF OF THE ACHIEVABILITY PART OF THEOREM 2
Let us first state two theorems that give us achievable secrecy rates for the wiretapped diamond-relay channel. These theorems are obtained by assuming symbol-wise relay operations and then considering the wiretapped diamond-relay channel as the wiretap channel [7] . These theorems are proved in the end of this appendix.
Theorem 3: For the wiretapped diamond-relay channel with the knowledge of location of wiretapped links, a secrecy rate R is achievable if
R ≤ I (V ; Y 1 |h) − I (V ; Y 2 , S T |h, g) (55) for some p(v) p(s [1:M] |v) k∈[1:M] p(x k |s k , h) such that H (S k ) ≤ C and E[X 2 k ] ≤ P for k ∈ [1 : M].
Theorem 4: For the wiretapped diamond-relay channel without the knowledge of location of wiretapped links, a secrecy rate R is achievable if
Next, let us present two lemmas used for the proof. The proofs of these lemmas are relegated to the end of this appendix. The first lemma is a result from Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation [26] , which plays a key role in the analysis of interference alignment. 
The following lemma is used for constructing linear combinations of fictitious message symbols for the case without the knowledge of location of wiretapped links.
Lemma 2: For any positive integers j and k such that j ≤ k, we can construct a j × k matrix with the following properties:
• each element of is a non-negative integer smaller than p, where p is the smallest prime number greater than or equal to k, and • any j columns are linearly independent. Now, we are ready to prove the achievability part of Theorem 2. Note that it is sufficient to show the achievability of (α, 
A. Proof of the Achievability Part of Theorem 2 for the Case With the Knowledge of Location of Wiretapped Links
where V k, j 's and U k, j 's are independently generated according to Unif[C(δ, Q)] for some positive real number δ and positive integer Q specified later, and μ k, j 's and ν j 's are independently and uniformly chosen from the interval [−B, B]. We note that + N B) B. Then, the channel outputs are given as
Because S T = ∅, Theorem 3 says that the following secrecy rate is achievable:
To derive a lower bound on the RHS of (67), let us derive a lower and an upper bounds on the first and the second terms in the RHS of (67), respectively. We will apply Lemma 1 with τ ⇐ M N and hence we choose
for some > 0 with γ =γ −1 to satisfy the power constraint (63). Now, the first term in the RHS of (67) is bounded as follows:
where (a) is due to Lemma 1 with the substitution of Y ⇐ Y 1 , τ ⇐ M N and θ ⇐ M. 9 Next, we have C(δ, Q) is a subset of C(δ, M Q) . N and θ ⇐ 1, and (b) is because all channel fading coefficients are assumed to be bounded away from zero and infinity.
By choosing sufficiently small, we conclude from (62), (70), and (77) 
Let us apply Theorem 3 with the following choice of p(v) p(s [1:M] |v) k∈ [1:M] p(x k |s k , h):
where V k 's and U k 's are independently generated according to Unif[C(δ, Q)] for some positive real number δ and positive integer Q specified later. We note that
whereγ = 2 + B 2 . Then, the channel outputs are given as follows:
Because S T = ∅, from Theorem 3, the following secrecy rate is achievable:
To derive a lower bound on the RHS of (85), let us derive a lower and an upper bounds on the first and the second terms in the RHS of (85), respectively. We will apply Lemma 1 with τ ⇐ N and hence we choose
for some > 0 with γ =γ −1 to satisfy the power constraint (82). Now, the first term in the RHS of (85) is bounded as follows:
where (a) is due to Lemma 1 with the substitution of Y ⇐ Y 1 , τ ⇐ N, θ ⇐ 1. Next, by applying similar steps used to derive (77), we can show
By choosing sufficiently small, we conclude from (81), (88), and (89) 
B. Proof of the Achievability Part of Theorem 2 for the Case Without the Knowledge of Location of Wiretapped Links
For the case without the knowledge of location of wiretapped links, we superpose a linear combination of fictitious message symbols to each element of S k in the S-BCJ and S-CoJ schemes. 
1) S-BCJ-SNC Scheme Achieving
To beam-form each of F k 's in the null space of the destination's channel, ρ k, j for k ∈ [N + 1 : M] and j ∈ [1 : M − 1] is chosen as
Let ρ max denote the maximum of ρ k, j 's. We note that
Then, the channel outputs are given as
where χ k 's are determined from μ k, j 's, ρ k, j 's, h, g, and .
From Theorem 4, the following secrecy rate is achievable:
where the maximization is over all T ⊆ [1 : M] such that |T | = W . To derive a lower bound on the RHS of (101), let us derive a lower and an upper bounds on the first and the second terms in the RHS of (101), respectively. We will apply Lemma 1 with τ ⇐ M N and hence we choose
for some > 0 with γ =γ −1 to satisfy the power constraint (96). Then, by applying the same bounding techniques used to obtain (70), we can obtain
Next, let us derive an upper bound on the second term in the RHS of (101). We first fix an arbitrary T ⊆ [1 : M] such that |T | = W . Note that
We first bound the first term in the RHS of (103) as follows:
where ( Next, the second term in the RHS of (103) is bounded as follows:
where
is because U is independent from F, V, S T , h and g, and (b) follows from Lemma 1 with Y ⇐ Y 2,eff , τ ⇐ M N and θ ⇐ 1. Since the above bounds do not depend on the choice of T , we obtain
By choosing sufficiently small, it follows from (95), (102),
2W ]) denote 2W fictitious message symbols each independently generated according to Unif[C(δ, Q)] for some positive real number δ and positive integer Q to be specified later. We generate a vector L = (L k : k ∈ [1 : 2M]) of linear combinations of fictitious message symbols by evaluating L = F , where is an 2W × 2M matrix that satisfies the properties in Lemma 2, i.e., i.e., each element of is a non-negative integer smaller than p, where p is the smallest prime number greater than or equal to 2M, and every 2W columns of are linearly independent. Note that the domain of each element of L is a subset of C(δ, 2W ( p − 1)Q). Now, we apply Theorem 4 with the following choice of p(v) p(s [1:M] |v) k∈ [1:M] p(x k |s k , h):
where V k 's and U k 's are independently generated according to Unif[C(δ, Q)] and ρ k 's are chosen to cancel out the fictitious message symbols at the destination as follows. We first note that because any 2W columns of are linearly independent,
To beam-form each of F k 's in the null space of the destination's channel, ρ 2 j −1 and ρ 2 j for j ∈ [N + 1 : M] are chosen as
Let ρ max denote the maximum of ρ k 's. We note that
Then, the channel outputs are given as follows:
where χ k 's are determined from ρ k 's, h, g, and .
From Theorem 4, the following secrecy rate is achievable: for some > 0 with γ =γ −1 to satisfy the power constraint (127). Now, by applying the same bounding techniques used to obtain (88), the first term in the RHS of (131) is bounded as follows:
Next, let us derive an upper bound on the second term in the RHS of (131). We first fix an arbitrary T ⊆ [1 : M] such that |T | = W . Note that
Then, by applying similar bounding techniques used to obtain (110), the first term in the RHS of (133) can be bounded as follows:
Next, the second term in the RHS of (133) is bounded as follows:
Finally, the third term in the RHS of (133) is bounded as follows: 
where (a) is because S T is a function of U, F, and V , (b) is because U, F, V are mutually independent, and (c) is by applying similar steps used to obtain (110).
To bound H (U |Y 2 , V, S T , h, g), we note that S T can be represented as a vector of length 2W given as
where V ,T and U,T are N × 2W matrices that are determined from our choice of S k 's and T is a 2W ×2W submatrix of corresponding to the choice of T . Because any 2W columns of are linearly independent, the inverse matrix of T exists and hence we can represent F as follows: h, g ). Then, Theorem 3 is immediate from [7] . For the case without the knowledge of location of wiretapped links, Theorem 4 can be proved in a similar manner by assuming there are multiple eavesdroppers each of which observes every different S T such that |T | = W .
Proof of Lemma 1: According to the Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation [26] , for any > 0 and almost all λ 1 , · · · , λ τ except a set of Lebesque measure zero, there exists a constant k such that
holds for all (q 1 , · · · , q τ ) = 0 ∈ τ . Hence, the minimum distance d min (λ 1 , · · · , λ τ ) between the points in { τ k=1 λ k a k : a k ∈ C(δ, θ Q)} is bounded as follows: (154)
where (a) is because the probability that λ 1 , · · · , λ τ are included in a set of Lebesque measure zero is zero by assumption.
According to the Fano's inequality, it follows that 
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Let us show that the generator matrix of a Reed-Solomon code [38] with block length k, message length j , and alphabet size p satisfies the aforementioned properties. First, because is over the prime field GF( p), its element is an integer in the range 0, · · · , p − 1, and hence the first property is satisfied. For the second property, we first note that the sum, the difference and the product over GF( p) are computed by taking the modulo p of the integer result. Since a Reed-Solomon code is an MDS-code, any j columns of are linearly independent over GF( p), which means that the determinant of any j × j submatrix of evaluated over the prime field GF( p) is nonzero. This implies that the determinant of any j × j submatrix of evaluated over real numbers is nonzero, and hence the second property is satisfied.
